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It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The 
Implications of United States v. Jones–A 
Case of Sound and Fury 
 
Jace C. Gatewood

 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Reading the highly anticipated decision of United States v. Jones,
1
 
concerning the constitutionality of the installation and use by police of a 
GPS tracking device without a warrant, was much like waking up 
Christmas morning only to find out that you did not get everything on 
your Christmas list. Santa not only did not bring you everything on your 
list, but also forgot all the good stuff. So, all of the excitement and 
anticipation of the moment yields way to “Bah! Humbug!”2 feelings, and 
the long awaited moment becomes merely a footnote in annals of 
Christmases past. Such may be the case with Jones and its lasting impact 
and significance. Like the decision itself, the long-term impact of Jones 
on Fourth Amendment
3
 jurisprudence and privacy concerns in the wake 
of GPS surveillance and similar tracking technologies is likely to be 
much like the tale of the idiot—“full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying 
nothing.”4 
The Jones case garnered widespread coverage across the nation,
5
 
and became a polarizing topic of discussion especially among lawyers, 
judges, legal commentators, and law students. Even the average person 
on the street seemed to have an opinion regarding the authority of the 
 
   Associate Professor of Law, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. I would like to 
express my deepest gratitude to my research assistant, Kandice Allen, whose thorough 
research and tireless dedication were invaluable to the completion of this article. 
1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
2. “Bah! Humbug!” is the catchphrase used by Ebenezer Scrooge, the principal 
character in Charles Dickens's novel A Christmas Carol. CHARLES DICKENS, A 
CHRISTMAS CAROL 3 (Cricket House Books 2009) (1843). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
5. Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions after United States v. 
Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case” 1 (March 28, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030390. 
1
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government to secretly track the public movements of a person in 
everyday life.
6
 Many hoped that the opinion would finally put to rest the 
long debated issue regarding whether the warrantless installation and use 
of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement to track the movements of 
suspects along public roads constitutes a search or seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.
7
 But even more, many others hoped that the Court 
would ultimately provide some guidance on the degree of permissible 
intrusion that would be acceptable in the wake of electronic surveillance 
and other tracking technologies utilized by law enforcement in this 
digitally interconnected age.
8
 While the opinion specifically answered 
the question, “whether under the facts in Jones, the government’s actions 
violated the Fourth Amendment,”9 the opinion fell far short of providing 
guidance about the Fourth Amendment implications of the use of GPS 
tracking devices and other technologically advanced tracking methods. 
The opinion also failed to address any Fourth Amendment privacy 
concerns in the wake of such technologically advanced devices and their 
general use by law enforcement as investigatory tools.
10
 
In this digital age, spyware, smartphones, security cameras, license-
plate scanners, home security systems, body scanners, and other such 
technologically advanced devices are becoming common-place and are 
functionally capable of the same degree of intrusion as GPS devices. The 
Court’s reliance on common law trespass to resolve the ultimate issue in 
Jones leaves uncertain the constitutionality of many investigatory 
techniques that make the need for any trespassory intrusion superfluous. 
Additionally, when you consider third-party services, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, OnStar and other similar services, where large amounts of data 
 
6. See Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have 
Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 117 (2012). 
7. See, e.g., id. (“Many thought that, with the United States Supreme Court’s 
anticipated decision in United States v. Jones, we would no longer harbor any uncertainty 
as to when Big Brother was born.”). 
8. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, The Narc, and the Very Tiny 
Constable: Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113, 114 (2012) 
(“My . . . critique is leveled at the Court’s refusal to answer the . . . question . . . whether 
the police actions in Jones constituted a search, given contemporary realities regarding 
technology and social norms, regardless of whether a common law trespass was 
committed.”). 
9. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
10. See Barry Friedman, Privacy, Technology and Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, 
at SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/opinion/sunday/in-the-gps-
case-issues-of-privacy-and-technology.html. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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about an individual can be collected and stored,
11
 and the possibility that 
police may have access to this information without any trespassory 
intrusion, the decision in Jones appears largely illusionary. For these 
reasons, and because the Court avoided most of the complex Fourth 
Amendment issues implicated by use of technologically advanced 
tracking devices, the narrow focus of Jones
12
 may likely render its 
usefulness going forward mostly insignificant; merely a footnote in the 
annals of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
This Article discusses the implications of Jones in light of emerging 
technology capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in Jones 
with the same degree of intrusiveness attributable to GPS tracking 
devices, but without depending on any physical invasion of property. 
This Article also discusses how the pervasive use of this emerging 
technology may reshape reasonable expectations of privacy concerning 
an individual’s public movements, making it all the more difficult to 
apply the Fourth Amendment constitutional tests outlined in Jones. In 
this regard, this Article explores recent trends in electronic tracking, 
surveillance, and other investigative methods that have raised privacy 
concerns, including automatic license-plate recognition systems, 
smartphone tracking, and third-party subpoenas to access private 
information from third-party service providers. All of these methods may 
fall outside the purview of the current constitutional constructs identified 
in Jones, even though the accumulated effect of the information collected 
can provide a comprehensive record of an individual’s comings and 
goings. This Article makes the argument that neither Jones nor the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz v. United States
13
 
provides adequate Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless 
unwanted electronic intrusions by law enforcement or other 
nontrespassory invasions, even though such intrusion may result in the 
collection of vast amounts of information about an individual’s daily 
 
11. See Joseph Menn, Online Privacy Fears Stoked by Google, Twitter, Facebook 
Data Collection Arms Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2012, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/19/online-privacy-google-twitter-facebook-data-
collection_n_1287419.html. 
12. See Adam Liptak, Justices Reject GPS Tracking in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/us/police-use-of-
gps-is-ruled-unconstitutional.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Justice Sotomayor joined the 
majority opinion, agreeing that many questions could be left for another day ‘because the 
government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s Jeep supplies a narrower basis for 
decision.’”). 
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
3
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movements, either because there is no physical trespass involved, 
because of the nature of the intrusion, or because of the pervasiveness of 
the technology involved. 
 
II. Implications of Jones 
 
To begin, Jones did not appear too terribly complex, and with its 
unanimous decision, one would think that this was, in fact, the case. 
However, while the Justices were unanimous in their decision, the 
underlying reasoning beneath the Court’s holding was split five-four, 
with three Justices penning separate opinions, all espousing separate 
reasoning and, at times, criticizing the others’ rationale. To better 
appreciate all of the “sound and fury”14 of the Justices in their seemingly 
warring opinions, it is necessary to go back to the beginning. 
 
A. Brief Background of Jones 
 
In 2004, Antoine Jones, the owner of a nightclub in the District of 
Columbia, was under investigation for suspicion of drug trafficking.
15
 
During the course of the investigation, officers utilized various 
investigative methods, including visual surveillance, a pen register, and 
wiretaps.
16
 In 2005, based on the information gathered from their 
investigation, the government applied for a warrant to install a GPS 
tracking device on a vehicle driven by Jones, which was registered in his 
wife’s name.17 The warrant authorized the agents to install the GPS 
tracking device in the District of Columbia within ten days.
18
 
Agents installed the GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of 
Jones’s vehicle on the eleventh day while the vehicle was parked in a 
public parking lot located in Maryland, not while the vehicle was in the 
District of Columbia.
19
 Over a twenty-eight day period, the government 
used the GPS tracking device to record the vehicle’s movements, 
changing the battery at least once while the vehicle was parked in 
another public lot in Maryland.
20
 The GPS tracking device recorded more 
 
14. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4. 
15. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
16. Id. at 946. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 947. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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than two thousand pages of location data over the twenty-eight day 
period.
21
 
Based in part on the information gathered from the use of the GPS 
tracking device, the government was able to obtain a multiple-count 
indictment charging Jones and other coconspirators with conspiracy to 
distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine 
base.
22
 Jones filed a motion in the district court to suppress the evidence 
obtained through use of the GPS device without a warrant.
23
 The district 
court granted the motion in part as it related to data obtained while the 
vehicle was parked in a garage at Jones’s residence, but denied the 
motion as it related to data obtained while the vehicle was traveling on 
public roads.
 24
 The lower court based its ruling on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Knotts,
25
 that “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”26 Jones’s first trial 
ended in a hung jury on the conspiracy count.
27
 
In March 2007, Jones and others were again indicted on the 
conspiracy count.
28
 At the new trail, the government introduced the same 
GPS location data presented in the first trial and on this evidence Jones 
was convicted of conspiracy and received a life sentence.
29
 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Jones’s 
conviction, holding that the admission of the evidence obtained by the 
warrantless use of the GPS tracking device violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
30
 The District of Columbia Circuit Court denied the 
government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges 
dissenting.
31
 Following this denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on July 27, 2011,
32
 and oral arguments were heard on November 8, 
2011.
33
 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
26. Id. at 281. 
27. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 949. 
31. Id. 
32. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
33. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
5
GATEWOOD Macro Final 7/26/2013 4:49 PM 
688 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
B. Constitutional Precedent Leading up to Jones 
 
At the time of Jones, there were several existing Supreme Court 
decisions the Court could have used to help resolve the issue of “whether 
the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to 
an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”34 Principal among the 
existing precedent was the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United 
States,
35
 which established the reasonable expectation of privacy test—a 
search under the Fourth Amendment occurs only when an expectation of 
privacy that society considers reasonable is invaded.
36
 
In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening device to the 
exterior of a telephone booth used by defendant for illegal gambling and 
recorded the defendant’s conversations, which were later used as 
evidence to convict the defendant of wire fraud.
37
 The Supreme Court 
held that the defendant sought to exclude others when he entered the 
enclosed telephone booth, which allowed him to assume that his 
conversations were private and would not be “broadcast to the world.”38 
The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated 
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone 
booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”39 
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test informed the 
Supreme Court’s decision in numerous situations, including thermal 
imaging,
40
 aerial observations,
41
 curbside trash,
42
 dog sniff tests,
43
 and 
 
(2012) (No. 10-1259), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf. 
34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
36. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Augmented by Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion, the Court adopted a two-part test for determining when a “search” 
had occurred under the Fourth Amendment: “first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. 
37. Id. at 348 (majority opinion). 
38. Id. at 353. 
39. Id. at 353. 
40. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding thermal imaging 
technology used to detect heat emanating for the home of the defendant constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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traffic stops.
44
 But perhaps the most relevant precedent the Jones Court 
could have relied on involved the installation and use of beepers, 
arguably the closest predecessor to GPS technology. 
United States v. Knotts
45
 was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity 
to address whether the use of beepers to track a defendant’s location 
constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the 
Supreme Court held that monitoring beeper signals was “neither a 
‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth 
Amendment”46 because monitoring beeper signals did not infringe upon 
the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy.47 In Knotts, law 
enforcement, suspecting the defendant of illegal activity, arranged to 
have a beeper placed inside a container of chloroform that was purchased 
by the defendant for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs.
48
 After the 
defendant purchased the container with the beeper, the officers followed 
the defendant’s vehicle using a monitor that picked up the beeper’s 
signal, as well as visual surveillance of the defendant.
49
 Using the beeper 
signal, officers eventually traced the container of chloroform to the 
defendant’s cabin.50 Police obtained a search warrant, relying primarily 
on the information obtained by use of the beeper, and discovered an 
illegal drug operation.
51
 The Court concluded that while the defendant 
may have had a subjective expectation of privacy in his movements, “[a] 
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
 
41. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding aerial observation of 
the defendant’s home during helicopter flyover was not a search under Fourth 
Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-39 (1986) (holding 
aerial observation of an industrial plant was not a search under Fourth Amendment); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding aerial observation of curtilage of 
defendant’s home was not a search). 
42. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (holding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in trash left at curbside outside defendant’s home). 
43. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding no Fourth 
Amendment violation when officers subjected defendant’s luggage to a “dog sniff” test). 
44. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding defendants did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle which they did not claim an ownership 
interest). 
45. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
46. Id. at 285. 
47. See id. at 284-85. 
48. Id. at 277-78. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 279. 
7
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another.”52 The Court reasoned that following the beeper signal was 
analogous to visual surveillance of the vehicle while traveling on the 
public roads and highways.
53
 
Just over a year later, on almost identical facts, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue again in United States v. Karo.
54
 In Karo, after 
obtaining a court order to install and monitor a tracking beeper in a can 
of ether, which agents suspected would be used by the defendant “to 
extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported into the United 
States,”55 the agents used the tracking device and visual surveillance to 
monitor the can’s whereabouts.56 The agents relied primarily on the 
beeper signal, which led them to a residence rented by one of the 
defendants.
57
 The agents obtained a warrant to search one of the 
defendant’s homes “based in part on information derived through use of 
the beeper.”58 Upon execution of the warrant, the agents found drug 
manufacturing equipment.
59
 Relying on the Katz analysis, the Court 
affirmed the rationale of Knotts regarding the constitutionality of 
monitoring the beeper while on public roads,
60
 but concluded that 
monitoring the beeper while it was located in a private residence violated 
the Fourth Amendment and the rights of “those who ha[d] a justifiable 
interest in the privacy of the residence.”61 
Whereas Katz, Knotts, and Karo represented what most legal 
scholars and jurists believed to be the constitutional framework by which 
the Court would decide Jones, many were left utterly shocked by the 
Court’s almost total rejection of these previous constitutional precedents 
in favor of a doctrine that most believed was dead—the “trespass 
doctrine.”62 Legal scholars and jurists alike, for decades, had interpreted 
 
52. Id. at 281. 
53. Id. at 281-82. 
54. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
55. Id. at 708. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 708-10. 
58. Id. at 710. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 713-15; see also April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The 
Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 678 (2005) (“[T]he Court . . . 
implicitly accepted Knotts’s rationale regarding the constitutionality of DEA officers’ 
monitoring of the beeper as it moved on public thoroughfares.”). 
61. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
62. The “trespass doctrine” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was first 
articulated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and is based on the 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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Katz as replacing, if not overruling, the trespass doctrine,
63
 since the 
Court so explicitly and emphatically declined to resolve the issue in Katz 
upon a property-based theory.
64
 Katz’s complete denouncement65 of a 
property-based resolution left many to wonder about the fate of the 
trespass doctrine and the future of property-based Fourth Amendment 
arguments—that is, until Jones. 
 
C. The Jones Decision 
 
On January 23, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the 
warrantless installation and use of a GPS tracking device to track the 
movements of a suspect’s vehicle constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.
66
 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, wrote for the majority: “We 
hold that the [g]overnment’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, 
constitutes a ‘search.’”67 Though the decision was unanimous, the Court 
was split on which constitutional precedent to use to resolve the issue—
the older “trespass doctrine” first announced in Olmstead v. United 
 
concept that “the [F]ourth [A]mendment protected ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’ 
when these entities were located within a ‘constitutionally protected area.’” David P. 
Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment 
Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 710 (1977); see also 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (relying on the opinion in 
Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that the use of an electronic recording device did not 
infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant because no physical trespass 
occurred into the home or curtilage of the defendant). 
63. See Miraldi, supra note 62, at 712. 
 
Some lower federal courts have read Katz as expanding [F]ourth 
[A]mendment protection by merely supplementing the trespass 
doctrine. On the other hand, some lower federal courts have focused 
upon Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion and have read Katz as 
completely replacing the trespass doctrine with the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 732-33 (supporting the continued use of the trespass 
doctrine together with the Katz reasonable expectation test). 
64. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[T]he underpinnings of 
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”). 
65. Id. 
66. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-54 (2012). 
67. Id. at 949 (footnote omitted). 
9
GATEWOOD Macro Final 7/26/2013 4:49 PM 
692 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
States,
68
 or the reasonable expectation of privacy test announced in 
Katz.
69
 
The five-Justice majority opted to return to the property-driven 
concept, the trespass doctrine, first articulated in Olmstead.
70
 In relying 
on the trespass doctrine, the majority reasoned that applying common-
law trespass principles best preserved the degree of privacy against 
government intrusion that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s 
adoption, stating that “[w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”71 After asserting that “[i]t is beyond 
dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] 
Amendment,”72 the majority had no problem finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation. The Court declined to address much deeper issues 
such as the significance of the vehicle’s ownership, which was registered 
in Jones’s wife’s name, or whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle’s undercarriage or in the vehicle’s movements 
along public roads.
73
 The majority supports its refusal to delve into these 
deeper issues by asserting that historically the Fourth Amendment has 
always embodied concerns regarding governmental intrusion into 
areas—”persons, houses, papers, and effects.”74 The majority states that 
this understanding was not repudiated by Katz.
75
 Although the majority 
did not altogether ignore Katz, stating that Katz was not a substitute for 
earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the use of the trespass 
doctrine, but rather that Katz provided an additional test to be applied 
when there was no physical trespass involved,
76
 the majority nevertheless 
refused to address any Katz-related issues in the absence of a physical 
trespass, stating that “[w]e may have to grapple with these ‘vexing 
 
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Olmstead, federal agents installed wire 
taps in the streets outside the defendant’s home. Id. at 456-57. The Olmstead court held 
that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since there was no 
trespassing into the defendant’s home or curtilage. Id. at 466; accord Goldman v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1942). 
69. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
70. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50. 
71. Id. at 949. 
72. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)). 
73. Id. at 949-50. The Court stated: “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall 
with the Katz [reasonable expectation of privacy test].” Id. at 950. 
74. See id. at 953. 
75. Id. at 950. 
76. Id. at 952-53. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not 
involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason 
for rushing forward to resolve them here.”77 
Nevertheless, in response to Justice Alito’s concurrence and the 
government’s contentions, the majority seemed compelled to address the 
Court’s previous constitutional precedent by distinguishing the Court’s 
earlier precedent from the present case.
78
 Responding to Justice Alito’s 
argument that post-Katz precedent explained that “an actual trespass is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation,”79 
the majority found that this argument was “undoubtedly true [yet] 
undoubtedly irrelevant,”80 since the cases upon which Justice Alito (and 
the government) relied are factually distinguishable.
81
 Arguing from the 
premise that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has been 
added to, and is not a substitute for, the trespass doctrine,
82
 the majority 
reasoned that Knotts and Karo were not applicable because neither 
addressed the issue of trespass.
83
 In each case, as noted by the majority, 
the beeper was placed in the container prior to coming into the 
possession of the defendant and, therefore, neither defendant could 
object to the beeper’s presence.84 For this reason, the majority concluded 
 
77. Id. at 954. 
78. Id. at 951-52. But see Myers Morrison, supra note 8, at 118. 
 
[T]o distinguish Jones from Knotts and Karo on the basis that the 
former involved a trespass and the latter two did not seems to 
deliberately ignore the more salient difference between the cases. The 
surveillance in Knotts lasted a single trip and the surveillance in Karo 
only a couple trips. The surveillance in Jones was a 24-hour a day, 
28-day operation. 
 
Id. 
79. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)). 
80. Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion). 
81. Id. at 951-52. 
82. Id. at 952. The majority stated that Katz “established that ‘property rights are 
not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the 
previously recognized protection of property.’” Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 
506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992). The majority went on the explain that “[a]s Justice Brennan 
explained in his concurrence in Knotts, Katz did not erode the principle ‘that, when the 
[g]overnment does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in 
order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)). 
83. See id. at 952. 
84. See id. 
11
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that the defendant in Jones “is on much different footing,”85 since the 
defendant possessed the vehicle prior to the government’s trespassory 
invasion.
86
 In addition, though the majority saw no need to delve into any 
Katz-like analysis,
87
 it did make clear that the Katz analysis would apply 
in cases involving “merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass.”88 
Although in accord with the Court’s decision, Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion, which is joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, is very critical of the majority’s opinion because the latter 
entirely ignores post-Katz constitutional precedent (namely Knotts and 
Karo), which primarily focused on determining whether expectations of 
privacy are reasonable.
89
 The true issue for Justice Alito is “whether 
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the 
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove”90—a 
question Justice Alito answers affirmatively.
91
 This, according to Justice 
Alito, is the case’s most important issue and one Justice Alito contends 
the majority largely ignored.
92
 While Justice Alito was clear to note that 
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has its complications, he 
also notes that the Katz test avoids several key problems raised by the 
majority opinion, including potential incongruous results.
93
 According to 
Justice Alito, the majority’s approach would have led to a different result 
if the defendant in Jones had gained exclusive possession of the vehicle 
in question after the GPS was installed.
94
 Similarly, Justice Alito notes 
that if the ownership of the vehicle in which the defendant was driving is 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 947. 
88. Id. at 953. 
89. See id. at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
90. Id. at 958. 
91. Id. at 964. 
 
In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every 
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We 
need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this 
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-
week mark. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
92. Id. at 961. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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relevant, an issue the majority refuses to address,
95
 results “may vary 
from State to State” depending on marital property laws.96 Moreover, as 
further noted by Justice Alito, the majority’s opinion fails to address 
issues involving surveillance without a physical trespass.
97
 As Justice 
Alito sees it, in this day and age of new technology where law 
enforcement is no longer constrained by practical considerations,
98
 the 
best that the Court can do is apply current constitutional doctrine and ask 
“whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree 
of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”99 
Under this approach, Justice Alito would find that the government’s use 
of the GPS device over a four-week period was sufficient to violate the 
Fourth Amendment, although he declined to state at what point within 
the four-week period the tracking became a search.
100
 
Justice Sotomayor, though joining the majority, wrote a separate 
concurring opinion that also criticizes the narrow focus of the majority’s 
opinion and its refusal to address critical issues involving the use of 
advanced technology that do not involve a physical trespass.
101
 Justice 
Sotomayor joined in the majority opinion only because she agreed that, 
at a minimum, a search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment “‘[w]here . . . the [g]overnment obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.’”102 However, 
Justice Sotomayor thought the Court should focus on social norms and 
societal expectations.
103
 Justice Sotomayor explains that she “would take 
the[] attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the 
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of 
one’s public movements.”104 She states specifically that she “would ask 
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded 
 
95. See id. at 949 n.2 (majority opinion) (concluding that there was no issue 
regarding the status of Jones as merely the user of the vehicle rather than the vehicle’s 
owner since the government did not object to the Court of Appeals’ determination that 
registration of the vehicle did not affect Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.) 
96. Id. at 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
97. See id. at 958-59. 
98. See id. at 963 (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy 
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”). 
99. Id. at 964. 
100. Id. at 964 (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking 
of this vehicle became a search . . . .”). 
101. See id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
102. Id. at 954 (quoting id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion)). 
103. See id. at 956. 
104. Id. 
13
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and aggregated in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, 
and so on.”105 Under this rubric, Justice Sotomayor would find, as Justice 
Alito does, that long-term GPS tracking impinges on reasonable 
expectations of privacy and would therefore violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
106
 However, she saw no reason why shorter term 
monitoring in certain situations involving GPS technology, because of its 
unique attributes, would not also require particular attention by the 
Court.
107
 
To be sure, the Court’s ruling leaves many unanswered questions 
regarding the use of GPS technology in the wake of privacy concerns. So 
what are we to take from the Court’s decision? Since many of the 
significant issues were left unanswered,
108
 the Jones decision may be of 
little relevance for future cases involving technologically advanced 
surveillance and tracking, especially in light of emerging technology, 
including social media, that allows the tracking or monitoring of a person 
without any physical trespass.
109
 Moreover, even with the Court’s 
clarification that Katz should be applied in cases without a physical 
trespass, because the Court, including Justices Alito and Sotomayor in 
their respective concurring opinions, declined to address at which point 
within the four-week period the surveillance of Jones became a search 
(i.e., exceeded reasonable expectations society is prepared to 
recognize),
110
 Jones adds very little to the post-Katz formulation of 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 955 (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” 
(quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)). 
107. Id. at 955. Justice Sotomayor was very concerned with the sheer quality and 
quantity of information the government was capable of collecting on the defendant in 
Jones, noting that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Id. 
108. Justices Sotomayor and Alito each criticized the majority for failing to address 
several key questions, the most significant of which was whether the actions of the police 
in Jones constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment regardless 
of whether there was a common law trespass, given the realities of enhanced surveillance 
technology and societal expectations. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 
958-61 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
109. Justices Sotomayor and Alito each made passionate arguments about the 
pervasiveness of emerging technology and its effects on societal norms and reasonable 
expectations. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
110. See id. 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
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reasonable expectations. 
Notwithstanding that Jones may clarify certain doctrinal principles 
regarding what constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, this clarification may be merely a matter of form over 
substance in this wireless digital information age because Jones did not 
add any additional insight into the otherwise murky area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence regarding electronic surveillance and 
tracking. 
 
D. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence After Jones 
 
The Court in Jones ultimately failed to address the sweeping Fourth 
Amendment implications of the use of GPS or similar tracking devices, 
specifically, whether the warrantless use of GPS or similar tracking 
devices constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when there is no physical trespass involved. However, the 
Jones decision does provide some marginal insight into the Court’s likely 
future interpretation of the doctrinal definition of what constitutes a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
1. Doctrinal Definition of “Search” Prior to Jones 
 
Historically, the doctrinal definition of a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment involved some physical intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected area and, thus, trespass became the driving 
force behind Fourth Amendment protection.
111
 This concept became 
known as the “trespass doctrine” and is based on the concept that “the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment protect[s] ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’ 
when these entities [are] located in a ‘constitutionally protected area.’”112 
The “trespass doctrine” was the primary force behind Fourth 
Amendment protection for more than three decades,
113
 until the Court 
 
111. See Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in 
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423 (2007) 
(“Prior to Katz, the Court largely defined a search as a function of some physical invasion 
by the government.”); Miraldi, supra note 62, at 710-11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
use of the “trespass doctrine” as the thrust behind Fourth Amendment protection). 
112. Miraldi, supra note 62, at 710. 
113. See McDonald Hutchins, supra note 111, at 425 (“The Court continued to 
explicitly and implicitly endorse the analytical model requiring actual physical invasion 
15
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began to slowly break away from a property-based paradigm to a 
privacy-based paradigm.
114
 The Court’s decision in Katz marked the 
break from the use of the trespass doctrine.
115
 The Katz Court 
vehemently rejected any Fourth Amendment arguments based on 
whether there was a physical trespass, stating that “the underpinnings of 
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions 
that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as 
controlling.”116 Instead, the Court, aided by Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion, adopted the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test,
117
 
which requires a showing that a person has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
118
 It is against 
this backdrop that the Jones decision becomes relevant. 
 
2. Doctrinal Definition of “Search” After Jones 
 
As discussed earlier, the majority opinion in Jones declined to use 
the pre-existing Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test as the basis 
for its holding, asserting that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not 
rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”119 Instead, Justice Scalia 
formulated what may be deemed a new test, or at least a clarification of 
the previous test, to determine when a government intrusion constitutes a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia’s new definition of 
a “search” provides that a government intrusion will constitute a search 
 
as a necessary element of any Fourth Amendment search for another three decades before 
rejecting it in its entirety.”). 
114. See Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS Surveillance: Search and Seizure – 
Using the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of GPS Tracking Systems 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 303, 363-65 (2011) (discussing the 
shift from a property-based paradigm to a privacy based-paradigm under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
115. Id. at 365 (“Katz marked the first articulation of the Court’s outright rejection 
of a property-based analysis, stating that the Fourth Amendment’s reach ‘cannot turn 
upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion into any enclosure.’”). 
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
117. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
118. See id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (“[The] capacity to claim 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who 
claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353)). 
119. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the intrusion: (i) 
constitutes a common law physical trespass;
120
 (ii) invades a 
constitutionally protected area enumerated in the Fourth Amendment: 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects”;121 and, (iii) is done “for the 
purpose of obtaining information,”122 or is “an attempt to find something 
or to obtain information.”123 In addition, the majority opinion makes 
clear that this new formulation does not prevent the use of the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in cases involving government 
intrusion where there is no physical trespass, thus preserving Katz and its 
progeny.
124
 Hence, after Jones, there are now two doctrinal bases upon 
which a defendant may challenge investigative techniques employed by 
law enforcement: the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the 
Jones newly formulated trespassory test.
125
 
However, notwithstanding the new formulation and clarification 
under Jones, in this technologically advanced society with the advent of 
computers, smartphones, and other wireless electronics devices capable 
of remotely eliciting information so vast and comprehensive, neither 
Katz nor Jones may be far reaching enough to find a Fourth Amendment 
violation for such an elicitation—a Katz analysis is not satisfied because 
of the complexity and the pervasiveness of the technology used, and a 
Jones analysis is not satisfied because there is no common-law trespass. 
 
 
120. Id. at 949. After finding that a vehicle was an “effect” for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that “[t]he [g]overnment physically occupied 
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a 
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. The Court further clarified that “obtaining . 
. . information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such . . . trespass or invasion 
of privacy.” Id. at 951 n.5. 
121. Id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood 
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”). 
122. Id. at 949. In defining “search” the Supreme Court explains “[a] trespass on 
‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done 
to obtain information . . . .” Id. at 951 n.5 (emphasis added). 
123. Id. at 951 n.5. The Court makes a further clarification in defining search: 
“Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was present 
here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 953. The majority states, in response to Justice Alito’s concurrence, 
“[f]or unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make 
trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without a trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
125. See id. 
17
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3. Practical Value of Jones 
 
Jones may be of little value in this ever-advancing digital age where 
the breadth and depth of technology make police investigative methods 
less physically intrusive, less costly, and more comprehensive. As stated 
by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion, “physical intrusion is 
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”126 For this reason, 
Justice Sotomayor points out that the majority opinion’s trespassory test 
provides little guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of 
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property . . . 
.”127 Justice Alito shares in this sentiment and raises a very thought-
provoking question. Assuming that what matters most to the majority’s 
position is “the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment,”128 would sending of an unwanted electronic 
signal that makes contact with an electronic device constitute a 
trespass?
129
 His point being that there remains a question as to whether 
an electronic transmission equates to a physical touching as required by 
common-law trespass.
130
 
But, perhaps even more troublesome to Justice Alito was the 
majority’s outright refusal to engage in any Katz analysis,131 even though 
both Justices Alito and Sotomayor also had concerns over the application 
of Katz.
132
 While pointing out observations made by Justice Alito, Justice 
Sotomayor states “the same technological advances that . . . [make] 
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz 
test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”133 On this 
point, Justice Alito adds, “[t]he availability and use of [smartphones and 
other wireless devices] will continue to shape the average person’s 
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.”134 Justice 
 
126. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
129. Id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 961 (“Disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law is 
only one of the problems with the Court’s approach in this case.”). 
132. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he same technological 
advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect 
the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”); id. at 962 
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (acknowledging that Katz is “not without its own 
difficulties.”). 
133. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
134. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
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Alito’s position is that, with the reshaping of societal expectations, the 
Court’s only role should be to assess whether the particular use of the 
device in question “involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable 
person would not have anticipated,”135 and that the rest should be left to 
Congress and the States.
136
 
According to the majority, the problems posed by the application of 
Katz extend far beyond the mere determination of whether it was 
necessary to engage in a Katz analysis to resolve the issue in Jones.
137
 
The issue that the majority finds “particularly vexing”138 is why, as 
indicated by Justice Alito, under a Katz analysis a “[four]-week 
investigation [was] ‘surely’ too long and why a drug-trafficking 
conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an 
‘extraordinary offens[e]’ which may permit longer observation.”139 The 
majority’s query therefore considers the extent to which the Court should 
consider the nature of the offense being investigated
140
 in order to 
determine the scope of reasonableness of the investigation.
141
 These and 
other perplexing questions present a “novelty into [Fourth Amendment] 
jurisprudence”142 for which there is no precedent.143 
Clearly the “sound and fury”144 of the Justices leaves in flux the 
precise application of Jones and Katz to future cases involving electronic 
surveillance and tracking. Furthermore, several critical questions remain 
unanswered—some of which are raised by the Justices themselves—
regarding the application of Jones or Katz to purely electronic intrusions, 
whether in terms of duration of the intrusion, the physical nature of the 
intrusion, the scope or depth of the intrusion, or the nature of the 
investigation. Whatever the case, Jones provides very little guidance to 
law enforcement officials and lower courts concerning permissible 
Fourth Amendment conduct when electronic, technologically advanced 
 
135. Id. at 964. 
136. See id. at 964. 
137. See id. at 953-54 (majority opinion). 
138. Id. at 953. 
139. Id. at 954. 
140. See id. The majority questioned “[w]hat of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected 
purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terrorist?” Id. 
141. See id. The Court ultimately concluded that it was necessary to “grapple with 
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not 
involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis . . . .” Id. 
142. Id. 
143. See id. 
144. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4. 
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devices or investigatory methods are used as a means to gather evidence. 
 
III. Emerging Technology and the Limitations of Jones and Katz 
 
The boundary between privacy and emerging technologies goes far 
beyond the recent debate over the use of GPS technology. With the rise 
of social networking technologies—smartphones, factory installed GPS-
equipped vehicles, smartcards, electronic toll and highway security 
cameras, license-plate recognition systems, and other wireless devices—
privacy concerns are becoming more important and more prevalent.
145
 
These emerging technologies pose numerous challenges in the wake of 
privacy concerns.
146
 While would-be criminals have found it increasingly 
easier to commit sophisticated crimes while evading detection using 
advanced technology, law enforcement officials have similarly used this 
advanced technology to become more cost effective and efficient in 
foiling the would-be criminal. Alas, however, criminals are not 
constrained by the Fourth Amendment, only the government is. 
The government’s use of sophisticated surveillance and 
investigatory methods—like the GPS technology at issue in Jones—
raises serious concern over the degree of permissible government 
intrusion.
147
 However, it is plainly evident that the most common uses of 
 
145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that 
permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, 
closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. 
On toll roads, automatic . . . collection systems create a precise record 
of the movements of motorists . . . . Many motorists purchase cars 
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to 
ascertain the car’s location at any time . . . . 
 
Id. 
146. See Protecting Civil Liberties in the Digital Age, ACLU, 
http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“A 
constant stream of revolutionary new technologies erode existing protections, and greatly 
expanded powers for our security agencies allow the government to peer into our lives 
without due process or meaningful oversight. Our rights and liberties have undergone 
constant erosion since 9/11.”). 
147. Justice Sotomayor had very serious concerns, specifically stating that she 
would “consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any 
oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of 
the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and [sic] 
prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J. 
concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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technological investigatory methods employed by the government do not 
actually violate the Fourth Amendment under the proscriptions of Jones 
or Katz as currently interpreted. A few examples of emerging technology 
and other investigatory techniques used by law enforcement as 
investigatory tools illustrate this point. 
 
A. Automatic License-Plate Recognition Systems 
 
According to some estimates, automatic license-plate recognitions 
systems are capable of scanning more than 1500 license-plates per 
minute.
148
 These systems are used by numerous law enforcement 
agencies as a method to electronically collect tolls or for recording the 
movements of traffic or individuals, among other things.
149
 Police 
departments in Maryland are using license-plate recognition systems and 
are sharing the collected data with an antiterrorism agency run jointly by 
federal, state, and local authorities.
150
 In Connecticut, license-plate 
recognition systems are being used to track parking violations,
151
 while 
Florida uses the technology to track gang members.
152
 The federal 
government is also using license-plate scanners in Texas and California 
along known drug trafficking corridors.
153
 Local media outlets are 
reporting almost daily on the ever-expansive use of license-plate 
scanners.
154
 These systems use optical character recognition software to 
read vehicle registration plates.
155
 The issue that these license-plate 
recognition systems present is their indiscriminate use, capturing the 
license-plate information of all passing vehicles and storing the 
information into databases which over time can be used to track the 
movements of unsuspecting individuals—both criminals and law abiding 
 
148. See Hilary Hylton, License-Plate Scanners: Fighting Crime or Invading 
Privacy?, TIME (July 30, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913258,00.html. 
149. See Adam Cohen, Is Your Car Being Tracked by a License-Plate Scanner?, 
TIME (Aug. 13, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/08/13/is-your-car-being-tracked-by-a-
license-plate-scanner/ (reporting that the American Civil Liberties Union is looking at 
how the government uses license-plate recognition systems in at least 38 states.). 
150. Id. 
151. Hylton, supra note 148. 
152. Id. 
153. Cohen, supra note 149. 
154. One only needs to perform a Google search of the phrase “license-plate 
scanners” for an on-going list of reports concerning the use and privacy concerns of 
license-plate scanners. 
155. Hylton, supra note 148. 
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citizens.
156
 As one author sees it, “[t]he real problem is that when the 
government stores that information, it is not trying to solve an ongoing 
crime—it is building a database. These databases can quickly fill up with 
all sorts of details about how people lead their lives.”157 More critical to 
his argument is the fact that the details in the database may be pieced 
together over time to create a profile about certain aspects of an 
individual’s life, including whether they attend church, have any political 
affiliations, or have a mistress.
158
 This aggregating effect, known as the 
“mosaic theory,”159 was precisely what mostly concerned Justice 
Sotomayor in Jones.
160
 Yet, evaluating the use of these automatic 
license-plate recognition systems under Jones or Katz makes clear that 
the constitutionality of such a system is dubious at best. 
 
156. See id. 
157. Cohen, supra note 149. 
158. See id. 
159. “Mosaic theory” refers to the theory that the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts and that the aggregation of information may be covered by a reasonable 
expectation of privacy even if the individual parts are not. See United States v. Maynard, 
615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). In rejecting the government’s contention that no distinction should be drawn 
between the information discovered by use of a beeper in a single discrete journey at 
issue in Knotts and the more comprehensive monitoring at issue in Maynard, the circuit 
court applied the mosaic theory, stating that 
 
[T]he totality of Jones's movements over the course of a month—was 
not exposed to the public: First, unlike one's movements during a 
single journey, the whole of one's movements over the course of a 
month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood 
anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil. Second, 
the whole of one's movements is not exposed constructively even 
though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole 
reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of 
its parts. 
 
Id.; accord Madelaine Virginia Ford, Comment, Mosaic Theory and the Fourth 
Amendment: How Jones Can Save Privacy in the Face of Evolving Technology, 19 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1351, 1364 (2011) (“The mosaic theory is a novel theory 
in the Fourth Amendment context and it could dramatically change privacy 
jurisprudence”). But see Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic Theory” and Fourth 
Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 1748 (2011) (“The application of the 
‘mosaic theory’ to the Fourth Amendment would not only be wrong in principle, it would 
be impractical in application.”). 
160. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Concerned about 
the degree of intrusiveness capable with GPS technology, Justice Sotomayor questioned 
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated 
in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id. at 956. 
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First, under Jones, there would be no Fourth Amendment violation 
since automatic license-plate systems require no physical touching of the 
vehicle.
161
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the electronic transmission 
used to read the license-plate is deemed a physical touching, Jones still 
presents a problem. Generally, these license-plate recognition systems 
are used indiscriminately on all drivers within its vicinity and not for the 
purpose of obtaining information in connection with an investigation.
162
 
If nothing else, Jones made clear that “[a] trespass on ‘houses’ or 
‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is 
done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone 
a search unless it is achieved by such trespass or invasion of property.”163 
Obviously, such devices obtain information. However, it is not clear 
from Jones whether the information must be obtained in connection with 
an investigation occurring at the time the information is collected, or 
whether the information can be collected fortuitously and then used later 
to investigate potential crimes. 
Likewise under Katz, the use of license-plate recognition systems 
should not be objectionable. Since these systems only record short bursts 
of information at designated points, either while mounted on police cars 
or at toll booths, they may be even more analogous to visual surveillance 
than the beeper technology in Knotts and Karo, and certainly much less 
intrusive than the GPS technology at issue in Jones. Moreover, the Jones 
court left open the question whether shorter periods of surveillance or 
tracking would amount to a search under Katz.
164
 At least three other 
 
161. This argument necessarily assumes that the electronic transmission used to 
read a license-plate is not considered a physical touching. This issue is raised by Justice 
Alito, who questioned whether “the sending of a radio signal to activate [a vehicle 
detection system would] constitute a trespass of chattels . . . .” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., 
concurring in judgment). Justice Alito also questioned whether the application of 
common law trespass could reconcile recent decisions involving unwanted electronic 
contact with computer systems, as he notes that some courts have held “that even the 
transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is sent from one computer to 
another is enough.” Id. at 962 (citations omitted); accord Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (interpreting the Katz majority as holding that 
“electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private” 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
162. See Cohen, supra note 149. 
163. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5. 
164. Justice Scalia criticizes the concurring opinions for stating that investigations 
lasting four weeks are “surely” too long. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. Justice Sotomayor 
questioned whether shorter periods of surveillance than the four-week period in Jones 
might be unreasonable under certain circumstances, but never resolved the issue. Id. at 
955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Alito thought that the “line was surely crossed 
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Justices support Justice Alito’s position that “relatively short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”165 
Hence the primary issue that neither Jones nor Katz addresses is whether 
the “mosaic theory” accords with the proscriptions of the Fourth 
Amendment.
166
 As alluded to by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito in 
their respective concurring opinions, there may be situations in which 
tracking is so comprehensive it may be deemed unreasonable for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
167
 
 
B. Smartphone/Cell Phone Tracking 
 
Most smartphones today are equipped with GPS tracking 
capability,
168
 meaning they can be tracked in the same manner as a GPS-
equipped vehicle. In this sense, a GPS equipped smartphone can be used 
to track its own location, and by extension, the person or vehicle carrying 
it.
169
 In addition, it was recently reported that many smartphones are 
equipped with Carrier IQ software that monitors keystrokes, location, 
and received messages.
170
 Even the smartphone’s predecessor, the cell 
 
before the 4-week mark,” but declined to address at what point in the four-week 
investigation the surveillance amounted to a search. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
165. Id. 
166. Justice Sotomayor indicated that she would “take the[] attributes of GPS 
monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). Justice Alito also seems to be in accord with Justice Sotomayor when he 
states, “for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent 
made in the vehicle he was driving.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) 
(emphasis added). 
167. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
168. See Bonnie Cha, Road Warrior: Smartphones with Built-in GPS, CNET (May 
14, 2010), http://reviews.cnet.com/4321-6452_7-6564140.html (“GPS on smartphones is 
no longer an emerging trend. It’s almost a must-have feature nowadays, and more and 
more handsets are offering it.”). 
169. Smartphones may also be tracked using Wi-Fi. See Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, 
Your Smartphone Allows You to be Tracked Wherever You Go, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2012, 
11:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adriankingsleyhughes/2012/04/21/your-
smartphone-allows-you-to-be-tracked-wherever-you-go/ (“New technology by locations 
services firm Navizon allows anyone carrying a Wi Fi-equipped [S]martphone to be 
tracked without their knowledge or consent.”). 
170. See Kevin Dolak, Carrie IQ: Does Your Smartphone Have It, and Is It 
Tracking You?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2011, 10:51 AM), 
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phone, may be tracked as long as it is turned on.
171
 Cell phones register 
their location with the nearest cell tower every few minutes, whether or 
not the cell phone is in use.
172
 Mobile carriers often retain location and 
other personal data for months, and in some cases years.
173
 As a result, an 
individual’s location history and other detailed personal information may 
be accessed by law enforcement directly from the cell phone carrier 
using a third-party subpoena, including what establishments they 
frequent, where they buy their groceries, what friends they visit, where 
they go to church, and so on.
174
 All of this is obtained without a warrant 
and without the individual’s knowledge.175 
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly evaluate the 
constitutionality of smartphone or cell phone tracking, the Sixth Circuit’s 
recent decision in United States v. Skinner sheds light on how the Court 
may view this issue under Jones or Katz.
176
 In Skinner, the government 
obtained a court order authorizing the defendant’s cell phone company to 
release certain data pertaining to a pay-as-you-go phone, and ultimately 
discovered that the cell phone was used by the defendant in connection 
with drug trafficking.
177
 The data obtained by the government from the 
cell phone company included, “subscriber information, cell site 
information, GPS real-time location, and ‘ping’ data . . . .”178 Using this 
information, agents tracked the defendant as he transported drugs 
between Arizona and Tennessee
179
 by continuously “pinging”180 his 
 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2011/12/is-your-smartphone-tracking-your-
keystrokes-texts-and-location/. 
171. See Government Location Tracking: Cell Phones, GPS Devices, and Licence 
Plate Readers, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/government-cell-phone-and-gps-location-
tracking (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Government Location Tracking]. 
172. Id. 
173. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response – Cell Phone Company 
Data Retention Chart, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-
response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
174. See Government Location Tracking, supra note 171. 
175. Id. 
176. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
177. Id. at 774. 
178. Id. at 776. 
179. Id. at 774. 
180. Id. at 776. 
 
A cell phone “ping” is quite simply the process of determining 
the location, with reasonable accuracy, of a cell phone at any given 
point in time by utilizing the phone GPS location aware capabilities, 
it is very similar to GPS vehicle tracking systems. To “ping” in this 
25
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phone to locate its whereabouts.
181
 As a result of the tracking 
information, the defendant was eventually apprehended in Texas with 
more than 1100 pounds of marijuana.
182
 After the defendant’s motion to 
suppress this evidence was denied, he was convicted on two counts of 
drug trafficking and one count of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering.
183
 The Sixth Circuit, applying a Katz analysis, held that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
location from which the data was emanating from his cell phone.
184
 The 
court reasoned that “[i]f a tool used to transport contraband gives off a 
signal that can be tracked for location, certainly the police can track the 
signal.”185 The court equated the use of the phone’s trackability to the 
trackability of a car by use of its license-plate or the trackability of a 
fugitive by use of his scent.
186
 In this sense, the court found that the 
inherent trackability of the phone negated reasonable expectations of 
privacy in the same way a “driver of a getaway car has no expectation of 
privacy in the particular combination of colors of the car’s paint.”187 
Interestingly enough, the court would similarly apply this rationale to all 
cell phone users because of the phone’s “inherent external 
locatability.”188 
The Sixth Circuit found support for its decision in Knotts, stating 
that “[s]imilar to the circumstances in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on a 
public road before he stopped at a public rest stop. While the cell site 
information aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that same 
information could have been obtained through visual surveillance.”189 In 
addition, the Sixth Circuit found support in its own precedent. In United 
 
context means to send a signal to a particular cell phone and have it 
respond with the requested data. The term is derived from SONAR 
and echolocation when a technician would send out a sound wave, or 
ping, and wait for its return to locate another object. 
 
L. Scott Harrell, Locating Mobile Phones through Pinging and Triangulation, PURSUIT 
MAG. (July 1, 2008), http://pursuitmag.com/locating-mobile-phones-through-pinging-
and-triangulation/. 
181. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 777. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 777 n.1. 
189. Id. at 778. 
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States v. Forest,
190
 DEA agents, who suspected that the defendant was 
traveling to meet alleged drug couriers, called the defendant’s cell phone 
several times, hanging up before it could ring, in order to “ping” the cell 
phone’s location.191 The agents tracked the defendant using this location 
information, and the next day they arrested the defendant at a gas 
station.
192
 Following the Knotts rationale, the Sixth Circuit found that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the agents could have 
obtained the same information by visually following the defendant’s 
vehicle.
193
 
Arguably, the issue in Skinner would have been patently different if 
the GPS technology at issue in Jones had been used in a similar manner 
to track the cell phone rather than the “pinging” system, which may be 
arguably more similar to the beeper technology used in Knotts and Karo, 
because of the level of comprehensive tracking that took place in 
Jones.
194
 For this reason, the Sixth Circuit was quick to distinguish the 
level of tracking in Skinner with the level of tracking in Jones,
195
 noting 
that, while the Supreme Court in Jones “recognized that there is little 
precedent for what constitutes a level of comprehensive tracking that 
would violate the Fourth Amendment,”196 the Skinner case “comes 
nowhere near that line.”197 The Sixth Circuit was also quick to point out 
that Jones provided no support for the defendant’s position in Skinner198 
since there was no physical trespass involved.
199
 As with Knotts and 
Karo, Skinner can be distinguished from Jones based on the fact that the 
cell phone obtained by the defendant included the GPS technology prior 
 
190. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. 
Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005). 
191. Id. at 947. 
192. Id. at 948. 
193. Id. at 951. 
194. While the pinging method utilizes the GPS capabilities of the cell phone, it 
does not relay the type of 24/7 tracking information that was at issue in Jones. See Cha, 
supra note 168. 
195. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779-81 (6th Cir. 2012). 
196. Id. at 780 (citation omitted). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 780 (“Jones does not apply to Skinner’s case because, as Justice 
Sotomayor stated in her concurrence, ‘the majority opinion’s trespassory test’ provides 
little guidance on ‘cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not 
depend upon a physical invasion on property.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
199. Id. at 780 (“[T]he majority in Jones based its decision on the fact that the 
police had to ‘physically occup[y] private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.’” (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949)). 
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to coming into the defendant’s possession. Thus, the defendant could not 
object to the use of the phones inherent trackability,
200
 just as the 
defendants in Knotts and Karo had no standing to object to the 
trackability of the beeper-laden containers, because the beepers were 
placed in the containers prior to coming into the possession of the 
defendants.
201
 
Another issue inherent in the use of smartphones, cells phones, and 
other wireless devices, which issue was raised as a concern by Justice 
Alito in his concurrence in Jones, is the pervasive use of such 
technology.
202
 As Justice Alito notes, as of June 2011, “more than 322 
million wireless devices” were in use in the United States.203 His concern 
is that, as availability and use of these devices continues to grow, they 
“will continue to shape the average person’s expectations about the 
privacy of his or her daily movements.”204 Justice Alito may find 
persuasive support for this argument in Kyllo v. United States,
205
 which 
involved the use of thermal imaging technology to detect heat emanating 
from the home of the defendant. In an opinion ironically written by 
Justice Scalia, the Court held that use of thermal imaging technology 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that 
there was no physical intrusion into defendant’s home, because the 
technology allowed the government to obtain information about the 
inside of the home that was otherwise inaccessible without a physical 
intrusion.
206
 Justice Scalia went on to say, however, that “[i]t would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology[,]”207 and intimated that only when technology is not in 
general public use, such that privacy could be reasonably expected, will 
use of such technology constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.
208
 The inference being that when technology is more 
 
200. Id. at 777. 
201. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276 (1983). 
202. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“Recent years 
have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s 
movements.”). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
206. Id. at 40. 
207. Id. at 33-34. 
208. Id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the [g]overnment uses a device that is not in general 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4
GATEWOOD Macro Final 7/26/2013 4:49 PM 
2013] IT’S RAINING KATZ AND JONES 711 
pervasively used the scope of reasonable expectations of privacy 
diminishes. However, notwithstanding Justice Alito’s persuasive 
argument in Jones, he seems quite willing to allow acceptable societal 
norms or legislative actions to decide the issue of persuasive use.
209
 
Yet another issue that plagues the use of smartphones and other 
wireless devices is the “third-party doctrine” and the government’s 
ability to access a tremendous amount of personal information, including 
by means of tracking, directly from third-party service providers, through 
the subpoena process or otherwise.
210
 
 
C. Third-Party Service Providers and the “Third-Party Doctrine” 
 
Privacy concerns over social networking sites, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, where people share the utmost intimate details, photos, and 
information about their personal lives, and service providers, like 
Amazon, Google, and iTunes, that collect vast amounts of information 
about our choices, have become a major topic of concern among the 
legal community.
211
 When considering the vast amount of information 
stored with some of these sites and service providers, the issue becomes 
immediately apparent. When a user shares his or her personal 
information with social networking sites or decides to shop with third-
party service providers, his or her data is stored and hosted on the third-
party’s hardware.212 In most instances, there is nothing to prevent 
government investigators from trying to subpoena the information 
without an individual’s knowledge or consent.213 Under the long-
 
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable 
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
209. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“New technology 
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many 
people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. . . . On the other hand, concern about new 
intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these 
intrusions.”). 
210. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
211. See, Adam Cohen, Should the FBI Be Allowed to Wiretap Facebook, TIME 
(May 29, 2012), http://www.ideas.time.com/2012/05/29/should-the-fbi-be-allowed-to-
wiretap-facebook/. 
212. See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy – Full Version, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=%20322194465300 (last updated Oct. 29, 
2009). Sections Two and Three of Facebook’s Privacy Policy make clear that the 
information one provides to Facebook may not only be stored but shared under various 
circumstances. 
213. Id. Section Five of Facebook’s Privacy Policy states in pertinent part: “We 
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standing “third-party doctrine,”214 these instances of government 
intrusion into an individual’s personal life will fall outside of the purview 
of Jones and Katz. 
Under Jones, since the shared information is stored and hosted on 
someone else’s hardware, there can be no physical intrusion. Even if the 
government is successful in obtaining the information for an 
“investigatory purpose,” since there is no trespass, there would be no 
Fourth Amendment violation under Jones.
215
 
Likewise, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists under Katz 
precisely because the information was shared with a third-party and thus 
became the property of the third-party. The “third-party doctrine” line of 
cases directly supports this view. In United States v. Miller,
216
 the 
defendant was charged with various federal offenses, and moved to 
suppress certain financial records relating to certain accounts maintained 
with two banks pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.
217
 The 
financial information included microfilms of checks, deposit slips, and 
other financial records.
218
 The Court held that that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial records maintained by 
the bank since the defendant voluntarily conveyed the information to a 
third-party.
219
 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,
220
 the Court held that the 
use and installation of a “pen register” to record numbers which the 
defendant dialed did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment because the numbers dialed were made public to the phone 
company.
221
 
Justice Sotomayor for one thought the “third-party doctrine” 
deserved another look as being “ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
 
may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or other requests 
(including criminal and civil matters) if we have a good faith belief that the response is 
required by law.” 
214. The “third-party doctrine” provides that by disclosing information to a third-
party, such person gives up all of his or her Fourth Amendment rights pertaining to the 
information disclosed. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009). 
215. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5 (“[T]he obtaining of information is not alone a 
search unless it is achieved by . . . a trespass or invasion of property.”). 
216. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
217. See id. at 437-39. 
218. Id. at 438. 
219. Id. at 440. 
220. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
221. See id. at 742-46. 
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parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”222 She writes, 
“[p]eople disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their 
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with 
which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, 
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.”223 Justice 
Sotomayor concludes by saying, “I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection[,]”224 but, nevertheless, she was content to 
resolve the issue in Jones on the narrower basis of trespass.
225
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
While Jones failed to answer all the questions that technology 
creates, it did serve to highlight a previously glossed-over privacy 
issue—whether there is a privacy interest in the sum total of one’s 
movements.
226
 Though Jones dealt exclusively with GPS technology, 
which is capable of generating “a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about . . . 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”227 
other technologies, including smartphones, manufacturer GPS-equipped 
vehicles, license-plate scanners, and roadside video cameras, to name a 
few, all may be used in a similar manner to track and record isolated 
instances of an individual’s movements. These can then be stored and 
later aggregated to create a unique profile of an individual’s movements, 
and which can reveal personal information in a way not previously 
considered. This mosaic effect deeply concerned at least one Justice as it 
relates to GPS technology, and presumably any technology with the 
attributes of GPS monitoring.
228
 Justice Sotomayor wrote that 
 
222. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. See id. at 956. Justice Sotomayor seemed convinced that there should be when 
she states: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, more 
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id. 
(emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying note 227. 
227. Id. at 955. 
228. Id. at 956 (“I would take the[] attributes of GPS monitoring into account when 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of 
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“[a]wareness that the [g]overnment may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms. And the [g]overnment’s unrestrained power to 
assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to 
abuse.”229 She further added, “I would also consider the appropriateness 
of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a 
coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the 
Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to 
and [sic] prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”230 
Ultimately, with each new advancement in technology will come 
even greater and more precise methods of recording, storing, and 
aggregating information in a manner that may be later used to determine, 
with particular detail, how we travel, what we buy, what we read, who 
we visit, and so on. No physical intrusion of any kind will be necessary 
to acces the information generated by many forms of these technologies, 
and some may even become so common-placed we may just accept the 
loss of privacy that comes with the convenience.
231
 Yet still other 
technology may be used to record only isolated pockets of information 
comparable to visual observation so as to be unobjectionable. Whatever 
the case, it is clear that the constitutional tests articulated in Jones and 
Katz will fail in these instances. Consequently, as GPS and other 
technology with similar attributes continue to be employed by law 
enforcement without judicial oversight, the Court will be inundated with 
ever vexing and complex issues regarding privacy rights. As such, the 
Court must be willing to look beyond the facts of a particular case and 
address the issues in light of their overall effect on Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights. 
At the end of the day, Jones missed a huge opportunity for the Court 
to finally address critical issues on how the government uses technology 
(and not just GPS technology) to amass large sums of isolated 
information about an individual’s movements that can be later 
aggregated, and over time, used to develop a profile on how an 
individual lives his or her life. Because the Court chose to resolve these 
crucial issues another day, the true significance of Jones may be in what 
 
one’s public movements.”). 
229. Id. 
230. Id. (citation omitted). 
231. Justice Alito alluded to the same conclusion when he stated: “Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and 
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may 
provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people 
may find the tradeoff worthwhile.” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
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it did not say rather than what it did say—a case of “sound and fury, 
[s]ignifying nothing.”232 
 
 
232. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4. 
33
